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Selected Legislation and Jurisprudence
∵
European Court of Human Rights
ECHR 2018/6 Case of Ceesay v. Austria, 16 November 2017, no. 72126/14 (Fifth 
Section)
 The Facts
The applicant is a Gambian national who was born in 1969 and lives in 
Hamburg (Germany). The applicant’s brother, Y.C., also a Gambian national, 
born in 1987, applied for asylum in Austria in 2004. The application was dis-
missed in April 2005 and Y.C.’s appeal against the decision was rejected by 
the Federal Asylum Office. In April 2005 he was convicted of drug traffick-
ing and sentenced to seven months’ imprisonment. He started serving his 
sentence and, on 12 September 2005, was placed in detention with a view to 
his expulsion to The Gambia, following an order issued by the Federal Police 
Authority.
On 27 September 2005, Y.C. went on a hunger strike, of which he informed 
the authorities on the following day. On that day he was handed an informa-
tion pamphlet on hunger strikes. He was also orally informed about the risks 
involved and subjected to an initial hunger-strike examination.
Subsequently health checks were carried out daily. In the morning of 
4 October 2005, he was taken to a general hospital for examination and an 
*  These summaries are based on the provisional text of the judgements of the European Court 
of Human Rights. These judgments are still subject to editorial revision before their repro-
duction in Reports of Judgments and Decisions. For the full provisional text, see: http://www 
.echr.coe.int.
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assessment of whether he was fit to remain in detention. In its report the hos-
pital noted, in particular: that he had dry lips and kept his eyes closed; that tak-
ing his blood had been difficult because he had resisted examination; and that, 
if his general condition worsened, he would have to be force-fed and taken to a 
psychiatric ward because he “lashed out from time to time”. The treating doctor 
confirmed that Y.C. was fit to remain in detention. He was subsequently taken 
back to the detention centre and at around 11 a.m. he was placed alone in a se-
curity cell in view of his behaviour at the hospital. A police officer checked on 
him every 15-30 minutes. When he checked at 12.50 p.m., Y.C. was not breathing 
and had no pulse. At 1.20 p.m., Y.C. was declared dead by an emergency doctor 
who had immediately been called to the scene.
A criminal investigation into Y.C.’s death was instituted on the same day; an 
autopsy was conducted on the following day. The applicant joined the criminal 
proceedings into his brother’s death as a private party. In early January 2006 
the forensic expert who had conducted the autopsy submitted his final report. 
He concluded that the cause of Y.C.’s death had been dehydration combined 
with the fact that he had been a carrier of the sickle cell trait, which had caused 
a shift in the electrolyte system and had ultimately caused his heart to stop 
beating. Neither the authorities nor Y.C. himself had been aware that he had 
been a carrier of sickle cell trait. On 13 January 2006 the public prosecutor de-
cided to discontinue the criminal investigation, as sufficient evidence could 
not be found to warrant criminal proceedings.
In parallel, in November 2005, the applicant brought administrative pro-
ceedings to review the lawfulness of Y.C.’s detention and lodged a complaint 
about the conditions of his detention. In February 2006 the Upper Austria 
Independent Administrative Panel (IAP) ruled that Y.C.’s detention pending 
his expulsion had been unlawful and that the conditions of his detention dur-
ing the hunger strike had been in violation of his rights under Article 3 of the 
Convention. However, its decision was subsequently quashed on appeal on 
two occasions. On the first of those occasions, the Administrative Court held 
that the applicant had no standing to request a review of the lawfulness of 
his brother’s detention under Article 5 of the Convention (right to liberty and 
security). As regards the complaint about the conditions of Y.C.’s detention it 
held that the mere fact that a person was detained did not place any duty on 
the State to take measures because of the genetic disposition of that person 
without a manifest outbreak of disease in that person. Eventually the Panel 
dismissed the applicant’s complaint in July 2012, based on an expert report 
which had found that the need for testing Y.C.’s blood for sickle cell trait had 
not been indicated. The applicant’s appeals were unsuccessful.
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 The Law
 Alleged Violation of Article 2 of the Convention
The applicant complained that there had not been an effective and compre-
hensive investigation into his brother’s death, and that the causes of Y.C.’s 
death thus far remained unclear. The Court considers it appropriate to assess 
this complaint under the procedural limb of Article 2 of the Convention (right 
to life).
The Court notes at the outset that under Article 2 of the Convention, the ap-
plicant did not allege that Y.C. had died as a result of the use of force by the 
authorities. He complained of an insufficient investigation into his brother’s 
death. The Court’s task therefore consists of examining whether the guar-
antees under the procedural limb of Article 2 of the Convention have been 
respected — namely whether the authorities have complied with their duty to 
carry out an effective and comprehensive investigation in respect of Y.C.’s case.
The Court reiterates that a criminal investigation was opened by the public 
prosecutor on the day of Y.C.’s death. The Court finds that the steps taken by the 
public prosecutor were carried out promptly and without unnecessary delays. 
All relevant witnesses were questioned, evidence was immediately secured 
and seized, and an expert report concerning the cause of death was ordered. It 
was not disputed by the applicant that the expert Dr H. had been independent. 
The applicant, as a member of Y.C.’s family, was able to join the proceedings 
as a private party. The Court cannot discern any indication of shortcomings 
in the public prosecutor’s investigation. The criminal investigation was ulti-
mately closed by the public prosecutor as no sufficient evidence was found 
to indicate misconduct on the part of the persons in charge. The public pros-
ecutor thereby relied on the comprehensive autopsy report and expert report 
issued by Dr H., which clearly stated that death through the use of force could 
be excluded, and that Y.C. had in fact died of dehydration, combined with the 
fact that he had been a carrier of sickle cell trait.
The applicant also instituted administrative proceedings before the IAP for 
a review of the lawfulness of Y.C.’s detention and lodged a complaint about the 
conditions of his detention. In the course of these proceedings, several wit-
nesses and two experts were questioned. The IAP examined the evidence and 
delivered three decisions, two of which were quashed by the Administrative 
Court. While the IAP found that the authorities should have known that Y.C. 
came from a country whose inhabitants bore a high likelihood of being a carrier 
of sickle cell disease and therefore should have informed Y.C. of this potential 
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risk after he had embarked upon his hunger strike, the Administrative Court 
found that the mere fact that a person came from a country with a high rate of 
sickle cell disease did not mean that the State had a duty to test every person 
from a certain area for this genetic predisposition. After obtaining a second 
expert report, the IAP eventually acted in accordance with the legal opinion of 
the Administrative Court and dismissed the applicant’s complaints.
The Court notes in relation to the administrative proceedings that they were 
equally comprehensive as the criminal proceedings. Relevant witnesses were 
heard, an additional expert report was obtained, and the applicant played an 
active role in those proceedings, was able to lodge requests, and had access 
to the case file. Again, the independence of the court-appointed expert was 
at no point called into question by the applicant. However, he did submit as 
evidence a statement which focused on the calculation of Y.C.’s critical weight 
and possible mistakes which allegedly were made in that respect. The Court, 
contrary to the applicant’s allegation in that respect, sees no indication from 
the documents at hand that the IAP did not take into account the statement. In 
addition, the expert Dr H. concluded that the cause of Y.C.’s death had been de-
hydration, combined with the fact that he had been a carrier of sickle cell trait, 
and his death could therefore only have been prevented if he had been tested 
earlier for sickle cell trait, or if he had been aware that he was a carrier thereof. 
Another expert equally found that the calculation of the critical weight had 
had no bearing on Y.C.’s death.
As to the applicant’s argument that the domestic authorities erred in finding 
that they had not been under a duty to test Y.C. for sickle cell disease merely 
because he came from a high-risk area, the Court notes first of all that appar-
ently not even Y.C. had been aware of his being a carrier of sickle cell trait, 
and secondly finds no ground for disagreeing with the Administrative Court 
that the authorities had not been under an obligation to conduct medical tests 
without there being a clear indication or necessity to that end.
The Court therefore concludes that the manner in which the investigation 
into Y.C.’s death was carried out by the domestic authorities does not give rise 
to a violation of Article 2 of the Convention under its procedural limb.
 Alleged Violation of Article 3 of the Convention
The applicant complained that the medical assistance to his brother during 
his hunger strike had not been in accordance with the law. Furthermore, be-
cause (1) Y.C. had been kept in detention even though he had no longer been 
fit to be so held, and (2) had been placed just before his death in a security 
cell without a water outlet, his brother had been subjected to inhuman and 
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degrading treatment. The Court considers that these complaints fall to be ex-
amined under the substantive limb of Article 3 of the Convention (prohibition 
of inhuman or degrading treatment).
In relation to the applicant’s complaint that the medical treatment of Y.C. dur-
ing his hunger strike was not in accordance with the relevant laws and ordi-
nances, the Court notes in general that with regard to the steps to be taken in 
the event of a hunger strike, clear instructions were issued by the Ministry of 
the Interior to the authorities, which had been prepared after consultations 
with its medical service and various NGOs. The Court sees no indication that 
these instructions were in themselves insufficient or unclear, or that overall 
in the instant case they were not sufficiently followed. When Y.C. announced 
his hunger strike to the authorities, he was handed an information sheet in 
his mother tongue detailing the risks associated with a hunger strike, and he 
was examined by a medical doctor without delay. A hunger strike form was 
filled out and certain medical measures were taken on a daily basis by the po-
lice doctor on duty. There is no indication that any legal provision, internal 
order, recommendation or international material concerning medical care for 
detainees on hunger strike was disregarded. Furthermore, there were no in-
dications that Y.C. suffered from sickle cell disease and he was not aware of 
it himself. At the time, even hospitals did not conduct standardised tests for 
that blood anomaly. The Court therefore cannot blame the authorities for not 
having given appropriate instructions at the outset to conduct such a test for 
the applicant.
The Court notes that on the morning of 4 October 2005 Y.C.’s external ap-
pearance was that of a physically fit man who was aggressive because he did 
not want to be examined. Even though the applicant’s behaviour might, with 
hindsight, be considered as a sign of already advanced dehydration and a con-
sequent disintegration of his blood cells owing to sickle cell disease, that was 
not foreseeable at the time of the events. When he died, Y.C. weighed 59 kg. 
There were no indications that his weight had ever been wrongly calculated 
and that he had possibly reached his critical weight (54 kg) before he died on 
4 October 2005.
In the light of those facts and the witness and expert statements, the Court 
sees no reason to question the domestic courts’ conclusion that the authori-
ties could not have been aware that Y.C. was in a life-threatening situation 
requiring urgent medical attention. It was not foreseeable that, if his health 
declined, the rate of decline would be precipitous due to the undetected sickle 
cell disease.
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Turning to the applicant’s complaint that the measure of placing Y.C. alone 
in a security cell without any legal basis after he had returned from hospital on 
4 October 2005 had constituted inhuman or degrading treatment, the Court 
notes at the outset that the decision was based on the Detention Ordinance 
and was due to his aggressive behaviour in hospital. Furthermore, the ap-
plicant’s brother had access to medical care throughout his detention, care 
which was even provided on a daily basis after he had announced his hunger 
strike, only six days before his death. This constant medical care was based 
on a developed domestic practice concerning the treatment of hunger strik-
ers and was in compliance with international standards. Moreover, the appli-
cant’s brother was examined in hospital a few hours before his death. While 
it is true that Y.C. could have requested a water bottle at any time, it would 
clearly have been advisable given the situation to provide him with direct ac-
cess to water in the cell and to advise him to take in fluids. However, as it was 
not possible either for the hospital or the authorities at the detention cen-
tre to detect the critical state of the applicant’s health and the fact that he 
might go into rapid decline due to the sickle cell disease, the failure to take 
such measures cannot, under the circumstances, be considered as inhuman or 
degrading.
The Court concludes that there has been no violation of Article 3 of the 
Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously, holds that there has been no viola-
tion of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention.
ECHR 2018/7 Case of Lopes de Sousa Fernandes v. Portugal, 19 December 2017, no. 
56080/13 (Grand Chamber)
 The Facts
The applicant is a Portuguese national who was born in 1969. On 26 November 
1997 her husband was admitted to a hospital to undergo a nasal polypectomy 
(extraction of nasal polyps). The operation went well and the patient returned 
home the next day. Suffering from terrible headaches later that day, he im-
mediately went back to the emergencies unit at the hospital. The doctors on 
duty diagnosed psychological disorders and prescribed him tranquilisers. They 
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recommended that he leave hospital but the applicant objected. The next day 
the patient was examined by a new medical team that detected bacterial men-
ingitis (Pseudomonas). He was transferred to intensive care until 5 December 
1997. He was then taken into the general medicine department, where he was 
treated by Doctor J.V. He left the hospital on 13 December 1997, his state of 
health being regarded as stable. As his pain subsequently persisted, he went 
again three times to the emergency unit at the same hospital, where he was 
hospitalised twice. On 3 February 1998 Doctor J.V. authorised him to leave hos-
pital, but, his state of health having worsened, he was admitted on 17 February 
1998 to another hospital. He died there on 8 March 1998 from the consequenc-
es of septicaemia caused by peritonitis and hollow viscera perforation.
In response to a letter from the applicant wishing to understand the sudden 
decline in her husband’s health, the Inspector General for Health (IGH) or-
dered an investigation. Reports of 2002 and 2005 concluded that her husband 
had been treated correctly. The IGH thus decided to close the case, but the ap-
plicant contested that decision. Fresh assessments ordered by the IGH showed 
that the decision by Doctor J.V. to send the patient for outpatient treatment 
had not been adequate and appropriate, as that doctor had not acted with the 
requisite prudence and diligence, and had shown negligence in the medical 
assistance provided. The IGH thus ordered the opening of a disciplinary pro-
cedure against him.
The complaint by the applicant to the Medical Association was unsuccess-
ful. She then filed a new complaint for manslaughter with the criminal inves-
tigation and prosecution department. The District Court discontinued the 
proceedings on 15 January 2009 on the ground that there was no evidence to 
show that Doctor J.V. had been responsible for the death. On 6 March 2003, 
the applicant lodged a new application, seeking damages for the loss she had 
sustained as a result of her husband’s death. The court dismissed her claims 
on the grounds that it had not been proven that her husband had undergone 
treatment that was not adapted to his clinical situation. She appealed against 
that decision to the Administrative Supreme Court, which dismissed her ap-
peal in a judgment of 26 February 2013.
Next, the applicant lodged an application with the European Court of 
Human Rights. On 15 December 2015, the Court (Fourth Section) held, by a 
majority, that there had been a violation of the substantive aspect of Article 2 
and, unanimously, that there had been a violation of the procedural aspect of 
Article 2 (see European Journal of Health Law, ECHR 2016/4). Subsequently, the 
case was referred to the Grand Chamber.
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 The Law
 Alleged Violation of Article 2 of the Convention
Relying on Article 2 (right to life), the applicant alleges that there has been a 
violation of her husband’s right to life.
 The Substantive Aspect
The Court observes that in the instant case, the applicant did not allege or 
imply that her husband’s death had been caused intentionally. She submitted 
that her husband had lost his life as a result of a hospital-acquired infection 
and of various instances of medical negligence that occurred throughout his 
treatment, and that the doctors in charge of treating him had failed to under-
take the necessary measures to save her husband’s life.
The Court observes that the medical treatment provided to the applicant’s 
husband was subjected to domestic scrutiny and that none of the judicial or 
disciplinary bodies that examined the applicant’s allegations ultimately found 
any fault with his medical treatment. Moreover, none of the medical expert 
evidence conclusively established the existence of medical negligence in the 
treatment of the applicant’s husband.
The Court reiterates in this regard that, except in cases of manifest arbitrari-
ness or error, it is not the Court’s function to call into question the findings of 
fact made by the domestic authorities, particularly when it comes to scientific 
expert assessments, which by definition call for specific and detailed knowl-
edge of the subject.
The Court observes that in the present case the applicant did not com-
plain that her husband had been denied access to medical treatment in gen-
eral or emergency treatment in particular. Nor is there any information in the 
case file which would suggest such an issue in the present case. Rather, the 
applicant complained that the medical treatment provided to her husband 
had been deficient because of the negligence of the doctors who had treat-
ed him. In the Court’s view, an alleged error in diagnosis leading to a delay in 
the administration of proper treatment, or an alleged delay in performing a 
particular medical intervention, cannot in themselves constitute a basis for 
considering the facts of this case on a par with those concerning denial of 
healthcare.
Moreover, the Court considers that no sufficient evidence has been ad-
duced in the present case to demonstrate that there existed, at the material 
time, any systemic or structural dysfunction affecting the hospitals where the 
applicant’s husband was treated, which the authorities knew or ought to have 
known about and in respect of which they failed to undertake the necessary 
Downloaded from Brill.com01/18/2019 08:18:49AM
via Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen
205Selected Legislation and Jurisprudence
European Journal of Health Law 25 (2018) 197-217
preventive measures, and that such a deficiency contributed decisively to the 
death of the applicant’s husband.
It has not been demonstrated, either, that the alleged fault attributable to 
the health-care professionals went beyond a mere error or medical negligence 
or that the health-care professionals involved in the treatment of the appli-
cant’s husband failed, in breach of their professional obligations, to provide 
emergency medical treatment to him despite being fully aware that his life 
was at risk if that treatment was not given. In this regard the Court, contrary 
to the Chamber’s finding, considers that the alleged lack of coordination be-
tween the ear, nose and throat department of the hospital and the hospital’s 
emergency department does not, by itself, amount to a dysfunction in hospital 
services capable of engaging the State’s responsibility under Article 2. In the 
present case, the Court does not have at its disposal any evidence or other ele-
ments that would enable it to make any findings or reach any conclusions es-
tablishing a situation of structural or systemic dysfunctions in the health-care 
services in question.
In view of the above considerations, the Court takes the view that the pres-
ent case concerns allegations of medical negligence. In these circumstances 
Portugal’s substantive positive obligations are limited to the setting-up of an 
adequate regulatory framework compelling hospitals, whether private or pub-
lic, to adopt appropriate measures for the protection of patients’ lives.
Having regard to the detailed rules and standards laid down in the domestic 
law and practice of the respondent State in the area under consideration, the 
Court considers that the relevant regulatory framework does not disclose any 
shortcomings as regards the State’s obligation to protect the right to life of the 
applicant’s husband. Nor has the applicant argued otherwise.
Therefore, the Court finds that there has been no violation of Article 2 of the 
Convention in its substantive aspect.
 The Procedural Aspect
The Court observes that the applicant’s husband, who had been in good health, 
underwent a routine operation in hospital and ended up suffering from bac-
terial meningitis, ulcers, colitis and other medical complications which led 
to his death three months later from septicaemia caused by peritonitis and a 
perforated viscus. Thus, the Court considers that the applicant had arguable 
grounds to suspect that her husband’s death could have been the result of 
medical negligence.
The Court notes that in cases of medical negligence Portuguese law pro-
vides, in addition to the possibility of criminal proceedings, for the option 
of bringing proceedings for civil liability in the administrative courts against 
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public hospitals. The hospitals may in turn be entitled to claim reimbursement 
of the damages payable from the officials who acted in breach of their pro-
fessional duty. Furthermore, an application may be made to the Ministry of 
Health and the Medical Association seeking to establish disciplinary liability 
on the part of members of the health-care profession.
In the instant case, the applicant made use of all of the procedures men-
tioned above. The question is therefore whether, in the concrete circumstances 
of the case, given the fundamental importance of the right to life guaranteed 
under Article 2 of the Convention and the particular weight the Court has at-
tached to the procedural requirement under that provision, the legal system 
as a whole dealt adequately with the case at hand. It has to be ascertained 
whether the domestic proceedings were effective in terms of being thorough, 
prompt and concluded within a reasonable time.
As regards the thoroughness, the Court finds it appropriate to respond 
first to the specific complaints raised by the applicant regarding the lack of 
an autopsy and of her husband’s consent to his operation. As regards the first 
of these issues, the Court agrees with the Chamber’s view that the cause of 
the applicant’s husband’s death had not raised any doubts which would have 
required an autopsy to be performed under the statutory provisions in that 
regard. As to the second issue, in the absence of a specific substantive com-
plaint on the matter, the Court finds that the domestic judicial and other bod-
ies cannot be faulted for not delving into that issue in depth.
As regards the promptness of the proceedings before the Inspectorate 
General for Health (IGH) the Court observes that it took the IGH two years to 
order the opening of an investigation, and a further year to appoint an inspec-
tor to head the investigation. Secondly, evidence was heard from the applicant 
for the first time almost three years and six months after she had contacted the 
authorities. The investigation before this body therefore lacked promptness. 
The Court further observes that the proceedings before the IGH had already 
lasted for slightly more than seven years and ten months before the applicant 
was informed that the disciplinary proceedings initiated against Dr J.V. would 
be stayed pending the outcome of the criminal proceedings.
As to the proceedings before the Medical Association, the Court observes 
that the latter responded promptly to the applicant’s request by seeking the 
opinions of five of its specialist panels immediately after receiving the pa-
tient’s medical records, and that the overall length of the proceedings before 
the Medical Association was approximately four years and five months at two 
levels. This cannot be considered per se as unreasonable. However, the Court 
cannot lose sight of the fact that the proceedings before this specialised body 
consisted merely in examining the patient’s medical records and the opinions 
of the specialist panels. The proceedings were written and no evidence was 
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heard. Seen from this angle and in the absence of any explanation from the 
Government, the duration of these proceedings was also unreasonable.
The Court considers that the criminal proceedings in the present case were 
also ineffective for the purposes of Article 2. Firstly, they were concerned only 
with the narrow issue set out in the charges that had been brought and did not 
deal with any of the other instances of alleged medical negligence complained 
of by the applicant. Secondly, the proceedings were neither prompt nor was 
their overall duration reasonable. No significant procedural steps were under-
taken by the prosecuting authorities between 29 April 2002 and 7 December 
2007, a period of almost five years and seven months. The proceedings in total 
lasted for six years, eight months and nineteen days.
With regard to the action for compensation brought by the applicant be-
fore the administrative courts, the Court observes that the first striking feature 
of these proceedings is their considerable length. They lasted for nine years, 
eleven months and twenty-five days over two levels of jurisdiction. The case 
file does not suggest that such lengthy proceedings were justified by the cir-
cumstances of the case.
The Court further finds that, where there is a prima facie arguable claim 
of a chain of events possibly triggered by an allegedly negligent act that may 
have contributed to the death of a patient, in particular if an allegation of a 
hospital-acquired infection is concerned, the authorities may be expected to 
conduct a thorough examination into the matter. The Court considers that no 
such examination was conducted in the instant case, in which the domestic 
courts, instead of carrying out an overall assessment, approached the chain of 
events as a succession of medical incidents, without paying particular atten-
tion to how they may have related to each other.
In sum, the Court considers that the domestic system as a whole, when 
faced with an arguable case of medical negligence resulting in the death of the 
applicant’s husband, failed to provide an adequate and timely response conso-
nant with the State’s obligation under Article 2. Accordingly, there has been a 
violation of the procedural aspect of that provision.
For these reasons, the Court holds, by fifteen votes to two, that there has been 
no violation of the substantive limb of Article 2 of the Convention and, unani-
mously, that there has been a violation of the procedural limb of Article 2 of 
the Convention.
Partly concurring, partly dissenting opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, es-
tablishing that there is a substantive right to health care under the Convention; 
partly dissenting opinion of Judge Serghides; both judges conclude that the 
substantive limb of Article 2 has been violated.
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ECHR 2018/8 Case of Nedescu v. Romania, 16 January 2018, no. 70035/10 (Fourth 
Section)
 The Facts
The applicants, both born in 1976 and husband and wife, were childless, but 
wanted to have children, Therefore, in 2008, they decided to try assisted repro-
duction at a private clinic, the S. Clinic. The S. Clinic had previously applied to 
the National Transplant Agency (“the Transplant Agency”) for authorisation 
to function as a cell and tissue bank and user in accordance with the legal 
requirements, an application which was still pending completion in 2008. 
Following an ovarian stimulation and in vitro fertilisation, seven embryos were 
obtained, of which three were transferred immediately to the first applicant, 
who became pregnant and gave birth. The four remaining embryos were fro-
zen and put in storage at the S. Clinic in November 2008 with a view to their 
future use by her. On 15 July 2009 the procedure for obtaining the required 
authorisation from the Transplant Agency was completed and the S. Clinic was 
authorised to act as a medical centre that could function as a storage bank for 
genetic material.
On 24 July 2009, following a criminal investigation into the delivery of 
the above authorisation, the Directorate for the Investigation of Organised 
Crime and Terrorism attached to the Prosecutor General’s Office of Romania 
(DIICOT) closed the S. Clinic, seized all the genetic material found there, in-
cluding the applicants’ embryos, and transferred it to an institute of forensic 
medicine (“the IFM”). The applicants’ embryos and those of other couples 
were kept in containers. Each container had different vials for each set of em-
bryos. The embryos of more than 240 families were seized at the S. Clinic. As 
with other patients of the Clinic, the applicants were neither informed of the 
seizure, which they learned about from the media, nor consulted about the 
transfer of the seized embryos from the S. Clinic to the IFM.
On 13 March 2010 the applicants requested that DIICOT allow them to re-
trieve their embryos, as they wished to undergo a new assisted reproduction 
procedure in another clinic. They pointed out that it was of the utmost impor-
tance that they be allowed to retrieve the embryos rapidly since the storage 
period was to expire in August 2010 and there was a strict procedure for the 
transfer.
On 30 March 2010 DIICOT allowed the applicants to recover the embryos 
directly from the IFM. They had to be accompanied by an embryologist and 
provide a special container with liquid nitrogen.
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On 21 July 2010 the applicants went to the IFM accompanied by an embryo-
logist, however, they were not allowed to retrieve the embryos. They were 
asked instead to show that the Transplant Agency had approved the transfer. 
The first applicant therefore attempted to have a new ovarian stimulation in 
the hope of creating new embryos. However, on 18 August 2010, while being 
treated for premature menopause, she underwent a medical examination that 
revealed that her state of health did not allow her to undergo another ovarian 
stimulation. The applicants therefore resumed their efforts to retrieve the em-
bryos deposited with the IFM but were not successful.
On 12 October 2011 DIICOT appointed a public hospital, the P.S. Hospital, as 
the new legal custodian for all the embryos, including the ones belonging to 
the applicants. On 20 December 2011 the High Court of Cassation and Justice 
ordered the Transplant Agency to implement the prosecutor’s decision to 
return the embryos by allowing their transfer from the IFM to an authorised 
clinic or hospital of the applicants’ choice in Romania or abroad.
On 12 November 2012, P.S. Hospital informed the applicants that it could not 
transfer the remaining embryos to the first applicant as they had only been ap-
pointed as a custodian by DIICOT. In a letter dated 7 January 2013, P.S. Hospital 
reiterated that the embryos could only be retrieved after prior approval from 
the Transplant Agency and that an embryologist from the S. Clinic and a 
DIICOT representative had to be present.
 The Law
 Alleged Violation of Article 3 of the Convention
The applicants complained that, as a whole, the authorities’ behaviour had 
amounted to a disproportionate interference with their private and family life, 
because for more than six years they had not been allowed to use their em-
bryos for a new assisted reproduction procedure and had thus lost the possi-
bility to have another child. They relied on Article 8 of the Convention, which 
protects the right to privacy.
The Court considers that the joint parental project of the applicants, who wish 
to have a child by making use of assisted procreation using their own embryos 
is an intimate aspect of their private life. The applicants’ complaint concerned 
the refusal by the various administrative authorities to actually carry out 
the return of the remaining embryos that had been created at the S. Clinic, 
despite orders from the judicial authorities, which in turn prevented them 
from the possibility of having another child. The Court notes in particular that 
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following the seizure of their embryos and their being deposited with the IFM, 
the applicants attempted on numerous occasions to recover them, but failed 
each time. A request by the applicants to be appointed custodians of their own 
embryos was likewise rejected on 18 April 2013. The Court finds that prevent-
ing the applicants from retrieving their embryos as ordered by the High Court 
of Cassation constituted an interference with their right to respect for their 
private life.
Such an interference will be contrary to Article 8 unless it is “prescribed by 
law”, pursues one or more of the legitimate aims set out in paragraph 2 and 
is “necessary in a democratic society”. The Court must therefore determine 
whether the various institutions’ actions or omissions that interfered with 
the applicants’ private life were in line with the lawfulness requirement of 
Article 8 § 2.
The return of the embryos or their transfer to a clinic of the applicants’ 
choice was allowed in straightforward fashion by the judicial authorities: on 
30 March 2010 by DIICOT, which had taken the seizure measure in the first 
place, and on 20 December 2011 by the High Court of Cassation and Justice. 
While the seizure of the embryos appears to have been based on the Criminal 
Procedure Code because of the criminal proceedings against the S. Clinic, nei-
ther the subsequent deposit of the embryos with the IFM within the framework 
of the criminal proceedings nor the conditions for their retrieval from either 
the IFM or the new custodian appear to have had a clear basis in domestic law.
The Court takes note of the provisions which regulate the storage and use 
of genetic material, which were relied on directly or indirectly by some of the 
authorities and institutions when they refused to implement the judicial au-
thorities’ decisions to put an end to the seizure measure and order the return 
of the embryos, and also when they set additional conditions for implement-
ing those decisions.
It further notes that despite those provisions, the various institutions in-
volved disagreed on the conditions under which the DIICOT order to return 
the embryos could be carried out. One disagreement was on the need for 
prior approval by the Transplant Authority: the IFM, the Court of Appeal and 
P.S. Hospital considered that the Transplant Agency’s approval was required, 
while DIICOT did not. The High Court, in turn, found that the requirement for 
such approval was unlawful.
Moreover, the new custodian, P.S.Hospital, repeatedly argued that DIICOT’s 
depositing of the embryos with the IFM had been unlawful as the IFM had 
not been authorised to function as a genetic material bank. It also considered 
that moving the embryos from the IFM to the Hospital had been carried out in 
violation of the lawful requirements for such a transfer.
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Lastly, the Court cannot ignore the fact that P.S. Hospital considered that 
the flaws in the legal procedures related to the depositing, moving and hand-
ling of the embryos had been such that it seemed to be impossible to identify 
with certainty which embryos belonged to the applicants. It also stated that 
it could only store the embryos and could not perform any other operations 
with them.
In the light of the above, the Court finds that the manner in which the ju-
dicial and administrative authorities involved implemented and interpreted 
the relevant legal provisions concerning the seizure, the storage following such 
a seizure and the return of the applicants’ embryos was incoherent and thus 
lacked the required foreseeability.
In conclusion, the Court finds that the interference with the applicants’ 
right to respect for their private life was not provided for by law within the 
meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously, holds that there has been a viola-
tion of Article 8 of the Convention.
ECHR 2018/9 Case of Afiri and Biddarri v. France, 25 January 2018, no. 1828/18 
(Fifth Section)
The decision is available only in French.
 The Facts
The applicants, both born in 1966, are the divorced parents of Inès, who is aged 
14 and suffers from autoimmune myasthenia gravis. On 22 June 2017 Inès was 
found unconscious following acute cardio-respiratory failure. She was taken to 
a university hospital and was placed on an artificial ventilator in the resusci-
tation unit. The same day the applicants were informed of the seriousness of 
their daughter’s clinical condition. After carrying out tests the medical team 
observed very serious neurological deterioration, with severe and widespread 
brain damage. The applicants were informed accordingly.
On 7 July 2017 a multi-disciplinary consultation meeting was held, attended 
by the full medical, paramedical and administrative team. All those present 
were in favour of withdrawing artificial ventilation, regarding its continua-
tion as unreasonable obstinacy. The applicants were informed of the proposed 
action. On 10 July 2017 Dr B., head of the paediatric resuscitation unit, met with 
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the applicants and told them that if they opposed the withdrawal of treatment 
their decision would be respected.
On 21 July 2017, in view of the lack of agreement with the parents on the 
withdrawal of treatment, the collective procedure provided for by the Public 
Health Code was initiated, involving the full medical, paramedical and admin-
istrative team. Professor M., an honorary professor of paediatrics with a close 
interest in ethical and paediatric issues, took part as an external consultant. 
The participants reached the same conclusion regarding the withdrawal of 
treatment as the meeting of 7 July 2017, on account of the severity of the neu-
rological damage, the virtually non-existent prospects for improvement or re-
covery, and the fact that the patient was in a minimally conscious state as she 
was in a persistent irresponsive coma and no longer had brainstem reflexes.
The report on the meeting stated that, should the applicants wish their 
daughter to be kept alive artificially, a decent and appropriate life plan would 
be worked out. The report was sent to the applicants, who met the doctors on 
several occasions between 28 July and 23 August 2017.
On 11 September 2017 the applicants made an urgent application to the 
Administrative Court seeking a stay of execution of the decision of 21 July 2017 
to withdraw treatment. In an order of 14 September 2017, the Administrative 
Court, sitting on an exceptional basis as a bench of judges, ordered an expert 
report, to be compiled by a panel of three experts. The experts carried out clin-
ical tests on Inès, reviewed the additional examinations and met with the vari-
ous staff members concerned and with the applicants. They submitted their 
report on 17 November 2017.
Replying to the questions put by the Administrative Court, the experts stated 
that Inès’s clinical state corresponded to a “persistent vegetative state”, with an 
“extremely bleak neurological prognosis”, in line with the findings of the hos-
pital team, and that she was incapable of communicating with those around 
her. They noted the irreversible nature of some of the neurological lesions and 
the worsening of the patient’s diagnosis since her admission to hospital. They 
concluded that it would be unreasonable to continue with respiratory support 
and artificial nutrition.
The experts noted that the applicants had shown little involvement in their 
daughter’s care, and that their relationship with the paramedical staff had 
been very difficult generally. They observed that Inès had expressed a wish “not 
to live in the way she had at home during May and June 2017”. They pointed 
to the practice in situations of this kind — which had been followed in this 
case by Dr B. and his team — whereby the professionals did not withdraw 
treatment against the parents’ wishes. Lastly, the experts concluded that Inès’s 
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interests did not coincide with those of her parents. They therefore proposed, 
by way of exception, discontinuing the treatment and providing Inès with high 
quality palliative care.
In an order of 7 December 2017, the Administrative Court, sitting as a bench 
of three judges, rejected the applicants’ application. The judges based their 
decision on the findings of the expert report and noted that Inès’s wishes had 
not been clearly established. They specified that the view of the parents car-
ried particular weight but that the parents had displayed distrust of the doc-
tors, without having formulated a plan for their daughter. The court considered 
that, despite the parents’ objections, the continuation of treatment would 
amount to unreasonable obstinacy, and that the decision of 21 July 2017 had 
not constituted a serious and manifestly unlawful breach of a fundamental 
freedom.
On 20 December 2017 the applicants appealed to the Conseil d’État. In an 
order of 5 January 2018, the Conseil d’État, sitting on an exceptional basis as 
a three-person bench, dismissed their appeal. It considered that, in view of 
the medical data in the present case and notwithstanding the opposition of 
the parents, who had been involved at all times in the decision-making, the 
continuation of treatment was apt to amount to unreasonable obstinacy with-
in the meaning of the Public Health Code. It considered that the decision to 
withdraw treatment had satisfied the statutory requirements, and upheld the 
Administrative Court’s finding that it had not constituted a serious and mani-
festly unlawful breach of a fundamental freedom.
 The Law
 Alleged Violation of Article 2 of the Convention
The applicants complained of the fact that the decision to withdraw the treat-
ment of their minor daughter ultimately lay with the doctor despite the fact 
that they opposed it. They argued that they should have a right of co-decision 
under the collective procedure, in their capacity as the parents and persons 
with parental responsibility. They further contended that domestic law did 
not afford any effective remedy for parents opposed to a decision to withdraw 
treatment in respect of their minor child. The applicants further relied on 
Article 6 § 2 of the Oviedo Convention which provided that, where a minor 
did not have the capacity to consent to an intervention, it could not be car-
ried out without the authorisation of his or her representative. In so far as the 
applicants’ complaints concerned the withdrawal of artificial life-sustaining 
Downloaded from Brill.com01/18/2019 08:18:49AM
via Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen
214 Selected Legislation and Jurisprudence
European Journal of Health Law 25 (2018) 197-217
treatment, the Court will examine all the issues raised by the application from 
the standpoint of Article 2 of the Convention (right to life).
 The Legislative Framework
In the specific case of minor patients, the Public Health Code provides that, 
where a doctor is treating a minor, he or she is required not just to consult the 
parents but also to attempt to obtain their consent. In the present case the 
Conseil d’État has specified that the doctor has a duty “to seek the agreement 
of the parents (…), to act with maximum beneficence towards the child and 
to make the child’s best interests a prime consideration”. The Court concludes 
that the manner in which domestic law, as interpreted by the Conseil d’État, 
regulates situations in which the parents oppose a decision to withdraw treat-
ment in respect of their minor child satisfies the requirements of Article 2 of 
the Convention.
 The Decision-making Process
The applicants contest the decision-making process in so far as it merely pro-
vides for the parents of a minor patient to be consulted and does not give them 
a right of co-decision. The Court points out that, while the procedure under 
French law is described as “collective”, the decision solely lays with the doc-
tor treating the patient. In the present case the collective procedure has been 
conducted in accordance with the legislative framework and the parents in 
particular, as the persons with parental responsibility, have been consulted 
over the course of at least six formal meetings between 7 and 21 July 2017. The 
Conseil d’État has noted that, since Inès’s wishes cannot be established with 
certainty, the parents’ view has to carry particular weight, and that they have 
been involved at all times in the decision-making.
In the absence of consensus among the member States, the Court considers 
that the way in which the decision-making process is organised, including the 
designation of the person who takes the final decision to withdraw treatment 
and the arrangements governing the taking of the decision, falls within the 
State’s margin of appreciation.
The doctors and the care team attempted to reach agreement with the ap-
plicants in the course of numerous meetings. The Court notes that the parents’ 
wish not to discontinue their daughter’s treatment has been respected by the 
doctors. Even before the start of the collective procedure, the doctor in charge 
of Inès’s treatment has told the parents that their decision would be respect-
ed. At a meeting held after the decision to withdraw treatment, Dr B. again 
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has made clear to the parents that such a decision would in no circumstanc-
es be implemented without their agreement. The Court therefore considers 
that, despite the fact that the applicants have disagreed with its outcome, the 
decision-making procedure applied has satisfied the requirements arising out 
of Article 2 of the Convention.
 The Judicial Remedies
The applicants complain of the lack of an effective remedy in domestic law by 
which to contest the decision to withdraw treatment in respect of their minor 
child. In its decision no. 2017-632 QPC of 2 June 2017 the Constitutional Council 
has ruled, firstly, that any decision to withdraw or limit life-sustaining treat-
ment which would result in the death of a person unable to express his or her 
wishes has to be notified to the persons consulted by the doctor with a view to 
establishing the patient’s wishes, in a manner that enables them to exercise a 
remedy in good time; secondly, any such decision has to be open to appeal for 
the purposes of obtaining a stay of execution, and the appeal has to be con-
sidered without delay by the competent court. That ruling has been complied 
with in the present case.
The applicants have made an urgent application to the Administrative Court 
for protection of a fundamental freedom on the basis of the Administrative 
Courts Code. The urgent applications judge has not merely assessed the need 
to stay execution of the doctor’s decision but also has conducted a thorough re-
view of the lawfulness of that decision, after ordering an expert medical report.
The Court therefore considers that French law has provided for a judicial 
remedy in conformity with the requirements of Article 2. It holds that the do-
mestic authorities have complied with their positive obligations under Article 
2 of the Convention, in view of the margin of appreciation left to them in 
the present case. It follows that the applicants’ complaints are manifestly ill-
founded and have to be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3(a) and 4 of the 
Convention.
 Article 6 § 2 of the Oviedo Convention
The Court considers that it does not have jurisdiction to consider complaints 
under other international instruments. This complaint therefore has to be re-
jected under Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously, declares the application 
inadmissible.
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ECHR 2018/10 Case of Akimenkov v. Russia, 6 February 2018, nos. 2613/13 and 
50041/14 (Third Section)
 The Facts
The applicant is a Russian national who was born in 1987 and lives in Moscow. 
On 6 May 2012 he attended a protest against allegedly rigged presidential elec-
tions. After a peaceful march, a meeting began at Bolotnaya Square, where 
clashes broke out between the demonstrators and the police. The following 
month the applicant was arrested and charged with taking part in acts of mass 
disorder and committing acts of violence against the police accompanied 
by violence. He requested bail but detention was repeatedly extended until 
December 2013 when he was finally released under the new Amnesty Act.
This summary is restricted to the issues raised under Article 3 of the Convention 
as regards the alleged lack of medical assistance while in detention.
 The Law
 Alleged Violation of Article 3 of the Convention
Relying on Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment), the ap-
plicant alleged that he had not received adequate medical assistance while in 
detention.
The applicant alleged that his eyesight had seriously deteriorated during his 
detention, and that he had not received any treatment for that problem. He 
relied on a medical report of 16 October 2012 as proof that his myopia had 
worsened. The Government disagreed with the applicant, and argued that he 
had been regularly examined by medical specialists, including ophthalmolo-
gists and had been provided with the requisite treatment. They pointed out 
that from 17 September 2012 to 4 November 2012, the applicant had undergone 
an inpatient examination in the prison medical wing and that in 2012 he had 
had three consultations with an ophthalmologist at a specialist ophthalmol-
ogy clinic. He had also undergone a special examination, but it had not led to 
him being given any disability status.
The Court reiterates that even though Article 3 does not entitle a detainee 
to be released on compassionate grounds, it has always interpreted the 
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requirement to secure the health and well-being of detainees, among other 
things, as an obligation on the State to provide detainees with the requisite 
medical assistance. The adequacy of medical assistance remains the most dif-
ficult element to determine. The Court insists that, in particular, authorities 
must ensure that diagnosis and care are prompt and accurate, and that, where 
necessitated by the nature of a medical condition, supervision is regular and 
systematic and involves a comprehensive therapeutic strategy aimed at ade-
quately treating the detainee’s health problems or preventing their aggravation.
On the whole, the Court reserves sufficient flexibility in defining the re-
quired standard of health care, deciding it on a case-by-case basis. That stan-
dard should be compatible with the human dignity of a detainee, but should 
also take into account the practical demands of imprisonment.
In the present case, the applicant argued that no action had been taken by 
the authorities, in spite of his rapidly deteriorating eyesight. The Court notes, 
however, that the pre-detention diagnosis of the applicant’s myopia dated 
back to 2004, eight years prior to his detention. In the absence of any infor-
mation about his diagnosis immediately before his arrest, it is impossible to 
establish that the progress of his myopia from medium to high was attributable 
specifically to the period in detention. The Court has examined the applicant’s 
medical files submitted by the Government and has found that following his 
complaints he was given a comprehensive medical examination and was taken 
to an ophthalmologist on at least three occasions. None of the medical reports 
drawn up after those consultations indicate any threat to the applicant’s eye-
sight or the need for further tests or treatment. There is nothing in the case file 
to cast doubt on those reports. Furthermore, the applicant did not argue that 
he had not been prescribed, or provided with, correctional glasses or contact 
lenses appropriate to his degree of myopia. According to the last examination 
in the remand prison, the only recommendation he received was to have regu-
lar consultations with an ophthalmologist. The Court therefore finds no reason 
to believe that the Russian authorities failed to provide the applicant with ad-
equate medical assistance.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously, holds that there has been no viola-
tion of Article 3 of the Convention as regards the alleged failure to provide the 
applicant with adequate medical assistance.
Joseph Dute
Professor of Health Law, Faculty of Law, Radboud University, Nijmegen,  
The Netherlands
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